On 3 October 2005, the EU and Turkey finally signed a negotiating framework that would allow formal talks and screening processes to begin on Turkish membership of the European Club. There was the obligatory last-minute brinkmanship, with Austria demanding the insertion of an additional clause that referred to privileged partnership rather than full membership. However, this objection was overcome with a Croatian compromise, and the question now is to explore what happens in the next ten to fifteen years when negotiations between the EU and Turkey cover the 35 chapters (including judiciary and fundamental rights as well as justice, freedom and security, in chapters 23 & 24 respectively) and Turkey's need to adapt its political, economic and social system in such a manner that it implements 80,000 pages of EU laws. This, after all, is the EU-Turkey political dossier today, and the critical period in the years ahead will decide between an EU that insists upon the candidate country Turkey to accept the acquis comminautaire of the Union or a Turkey that dictates more or less its own terms of accession to the EU.

Principle 6 of the EU Negotiating Framework for Turkey clearly stipulates that the advancement of negotiations will be guided by Turkey's progress in preparing for accession. Such progress would include the Copenhagen criteria (with the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities) as much as Turkey's 'unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations and its undertaking to resolve any outstanding border disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, including if necessary jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice'. Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for Enlargement, told the European Parliament earlier that "the start of the negotiations will give a strong push for those in Turkey who want to reform the country to meet the European values of rule of law and human rights; they are also a way for the EU to have leverage on the direction of these reforms".

But let me recap for a moment. On 22nd September, I attended a conference in Brussels entitled December 2004-October 2005: Has Turkey changed? During the final plenary session, the discussions led to the unavoidable conclusion that the EU Commission was doing its utmost to justify the start of accession talks despite an implicit admission that Turkey had not yet met all the criteria for the start-up of negotiations. This EU position could prove disconcerting if it were to accentuate the yawning chasm between the political decisions adopted by the EU institutions (namely the Commission and Council) and the European population across the whole Union. After all, a recent Eurobarometer poll revealed that only 35% of EU citizens support Turkish membership, and yet the EU institutions are not heeding to the concerns of their constituencies but are proving why the ‘disconnect’ is growing alarmingly larger between an institutional and bureaucratic Union and its peoples. In fact, this phenomenon became abundantly evident when France and the Netherlands rejected the EU draft constitution on 29 May and 1 June 2005 respectively as an instrument - with much merit, I still maintain - that was nonetheless being imposed upon the European peoples without adequate consultation, coherence, transparency or feedback. - Continuation Part II: But what about the Armenian Genocide in the overall context of EU-Turkey dossier? -

Harry Hagopian
LONDON (UK)
© hbv-H @ 21 October 2005

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