No plan B for the EU, only one for Euroland

The release, today, by Europe 2020, of their much awaited Anticipation Paper on the follow-up of the Constitution's ratification process creates an interesting contrast with what is to be read or heard among the various EU institutions or governments. Contrary to what those who created the mess are saying, Europe 2020 presents its version of a B Plan, and rather bold one, but unfortunately a B Plan that only concerns the Euro zone. The EU per se is doomed to live with the Treaty of Nice, patched up with a few components drawn from the Constitutional project, until it is willing and capable to converge with a dynamised Euro zone called “European Political Community” (EPC) by Europe 2020.

The trans-European think-tank, and the only think-tank to have anticipated the failure of the Constitutional project, believes that the new driving forces of the European process now lie within the hands of the people themselves, and those of their leaders (if they have the ability to re-connect with the people). It does not think much of the EU institutions future-wise. Based on people's comments in France and the Netherlands, they even underline that the Commission is now one of the strongest negative argument fueling the “No” vote; they also highlight the sharp contrast between a high turn-out at these referenda and a very low participation at last year’s European elections giving a clear illustration of the falsity of the European Parliament's democratic nature.

But, as a core argument, Europe 2020 delivers a message which requires to be taken into serious consideration: from people’s expectations to economic and social constraints, Euroland and the rest of the EU are moving onto different directions at a growing speed. This “differentiation” process is therefore creating a structural need for two different answers to the current EU political crisis: an audacious political integration step forward in favour of the countries of the Euro zone ; together with a “wait and see” attitude as regards the rest of the EU.

No doubt that this call for a social, economical and political integration of the Euro zone will find an echo. Let’s keep in mind that in France as well as in the Netherlands, the ‘No’ vote won because about a third of the electorate moved from an expected ‘Yes’ to a final ‘No’, not because they became “anti-European”, but because they expected much more from a so-called Constitution. In a way, the ‘Yes’ voters plus the “disappointed pro-Europeans” who voted ‘No’ represent a large majority of voters, at least among the founding Member states. Another interesting element of Europe 2020’s analysis lies in its remark regarding the fact that the Euro zone gathers more “mature” Euro-citizens (as we know now, maturity does not mean ‘blind support’, but the ability to say ‘No’) than the rest of the EU, due to the fact that they have been exposed to the EU for a much longer time (almost 2 generations for the founding countries, compared to less than a decade for the vast majority the non-Euro EU). This exposure to the EU process has generated many different expectations compared to those of the newcomers who have still to understand what exactly they have joined (or compared to the ‘reluctants’ who have not yet fully accepted the idea that they were into the EU).

For our political leaders, beyond the usual analysis regarding the economic constraints of the Euro zone, this analysis may be up to the point if they do care to reconnect with their public opinion. My feeling is that those very political leaders who have embarked at 25 into the Constitution’s journey, ending up in a wreckage, will now be more reluctant to follow the EU institutions’s plans at 25, and will instead test first what their voters would like. In that sense, Europe 2020 is right: within the Euro zone, voters are expecting a better integration of the Euro zone, rather than more ‘great plans’ at 25.

As regards the EU, Europe 2020 calls for trans-European political parties which could speed up the process of convergence between the public opinion in the Euro zone and that in the rest of the EU. Europe 2020 does not seem to have much hope regarding any institutionnal ‘B Plan ’ for the EU.

Now a question is left wide opened. Where are the leaders needed for such a political step? Will they emerge from the current crisis? Or will they be the same as today, waking up from a ‘post-Constitution political nightmare’?

Three things are sure:

. the move towards trans-European political forces, independent from national politics, is on its way and will become an important political factor by 2009

. the differentiation between the Euro zone and the EU has already started with the growing influence of Mr. Juncker as EuroGroup President, and will lead sooner or later to a big clash with London who fears nothing more than this type of development; however my guess is that London has already lost because one cannot succeed fighting against reality!

. the same trend already announces the end of the European Commission's political role, the birth of the ‘Single Market Managing Agency’ instead and the creation of a new set of Euroland institutions, located outside Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg, including a new legislative body.

And, there is something else which is sure: Europe 2020‘s vision is the only one left on the European political market place.

Giacomo Poletti
Milano (Italy)

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