A LOOK AT GEOPOLITICAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SOUTH OSSETIA - The August conflict in South Ossetia and its outcome have clearly demonstrated the double standard policies regarding the issue of the respect of the territorial integrity of states .../... Beyond looking into legal considerations, however, it is perhaps worth looking at the geopolitical similarities of the two regions in order to shed light on the interests of the various actors involved.

The August conflict in South Ossetia and its outcome have clearly demonstrated the double standard policies regarding the issue of the respect of the territorial integrity of states.

Six months after masterminding the unilateral secession of Kosovo from Serbia in a violent breach of the international law, Washington and some key European capitals were quick to stand by an “absolute support for Georgia’s territorial integrity” over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Beyond looking into legal considerations, however, it is perhaps worth looking at the geopolitical similarities of the two regions in order to shed light on the interests of the various actors involved.

In this context, the first similarity between Serbia and Georgia is the presence, since the 1990s, of international peacekeeping forces in their autonomous regions.

American contingents had been part of the NATO forces in the Balkans; with 1,500 men in SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 5,000 in KFOR in Kosovo. Russia has had buffer forces in Georgia since 1992-1993, in a trilateral Russia/Georgian/Ossetian format in South Ossetia, under the observation of the OSCE, and in the forces of the CIS, under the observation of the UN.

However, the Russians have been complaining since the summer of 2008 that  the US is applying a policy of “double standards: the Americans had criticized the OSCE and UN missions, whilst Russia had succeeded in keeping away the Georgian army.

On the other side, KFOR in Kosovo is not questioned by the international community, despite a drastic security failure: 235,000 non-Albanians expelled, 1,200 ethnic murders, 156 churches and monasteries destroyed or damaged in nine years under the very nose of NATO.

The second similarity is related to the “unprecedented military deployment of US forces” in the Balkans, as well as in the Caucasus, since 2000. Since the Kosovo war in 1999, the US government’s strategy has been to transfer the essential parts of its European forces to the Balkans in order to better redeploy them towards the Middle East.

In addition to Kosovo’s Bondsteel, with a capacity of 7,000 soldiers, the US can also count on a presence in Szeged, on the Hungarian-Serbian border, two bases in Bulgaria constructed since 2001, as well as four bases in five years (2002-2007) in Romania, including two near Constanza (interface of Rhine/Maine/Danube and Black Sea).

 In the Caucasus, there are similarly abundant levels of activity of the American military-industrial complex. Since the “Revolution of the Roses” of December 2003, two US bases have been built in Georgia: Senaki near Abkhazia and Gori near South Ossetia.

Thanks to US financial injections, Georgia increased dramatically its military budget between 2003 and 2007, it has reinforced its military contingent in Iraq and has received considerable US military equipment – all with the hope of securing rapid accession to NATO membership. The Tbilisi authorities even announced that they were ready to install elements of the US antimissile shield on their territory.

In Azerbaijan, another US ally, the military budget went up from 135 million dollars in 2003 to 871 million in 2007: with combat planes, tanks and artillery pieces “made in USA”. These developments have revived the Cold War in the Caucasus.

The Russians are still operating with two bases : Gumri in Armenia and Gabala in Azerbaijan. However, an accord signed with the OSCE stipulated a retreat before the end of 2008 of Russia troops from Batoumi (Georgian region of Adjaria) and Akhlakalaki (Georgian region of Djavakethie). It is not a coincidence that in the summer of 2006, a first crisis occurred in Djakavethia, allowing the Georgian president Saakachvilii, helped by US instructors, to re-establish control over the autonomous region of Djavakethie.

The Russia-US conflict in the Balkans and in the Causasus is also linked to the issue of the the delivery of gas and oil to Europe. These two regions are important geostrategic spaces because they are important transit routes for gas and oil derived from immense reserves in the Caspian Sea and Siberia. What looked as a sure win for the US in the early part of the millenium has since turned into a true game of influence thanks to the return of Russia to the regions.

Georgia is a good example. In 2005, the pipeline Baku-Tbilissi-Ceyhan (BTC) was established by the consortium around BP and passing through Turkey, a US ally; however, the Baku-Tbilissi-Batumi (BTB) route ending on the Black Sea was already there. In the Balkans, the AMBO Burgas (Bulgaria)-Durres (Albania) corridor had a nice future due to a monopoly of transit of oil from Novorossisk towards Western Europe.

But the latest events have changed the situation. Since the Ossetian crisis, the BTB has been closed several times, while the BTC, ending in Turkey, is subject to doubt since the September 2008 attacks by the Kurdish PKK.

“The reputation of Georgia as a secure alternative route for the pipelines has been compromised”, says Robert Johnson, Energy director at the Eurasia group. “If you cancel out the Georgian option, most of the other viable options pass across Russia”.

This is putting up the third Russian path Baku-Novorossisk, since the establishment of a route bypassing Chechnya. This “Russian” route is taking all of its importance with the 2007 opening of the pipeline Burgas (Bulgaria) – Alexandropoulis (Greece).

In terms of gas, the same evolution is underway. In 2002, the Nabucco gas pipeline was launched on the path of Baku-Ankara-Sofia-Budapest-Sofia. Planned with the intention of competing with the Russian gas networks of Droujba (Russia-Central Europe), it was supposed to supply Western Europe by 2012 with “friendly” gas from the Caspian Sea and Iran. But the Russians have since launched the South Stream, a competing project, passing notably through Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece.

This is not a coincidence since the intersection of three oil pipelines and two gas pipelines is starting around Georgia and leading midway around Kosovo. In this light, events linked to secessionist movements in the two regions since 1999 can be seen through the geopolitical lens.

Alexis Troude* 
(C), (R) The Kosovo Compromise Project, 2009

* Alexis Troude is Researcher at the “International Academy of Geopolitics” in Paris and author of “Geopolitics of Serbia” (2006).

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