If the main governmental holders of US Treasury Bonds follow Voltaire’s famous advice « If you see a banker jump out of a window, follow him; there is surely money to be made! », the decisions that Chinese, Japanese and European central bankers will make are easy to anticipate. As regards oil-producing countries, obviously they have already anticipated the trend: one of the big financial « mysteries » of the year 2005 related to the fact that extra petro-dollars earned by them no longer returned to be invested in the US as used to be the case. The envisaged explanation is that they preferred to invest them in Asia, or Europe, or in their own region[2], in consideration of the increased risk of assets’ freezing in case of legal disagreement or problem. This situation once again illustrates another decisive factor of the approaching crisis: the generalised loss of confidence in the Dollar and in the US government; knowing that for a reserve currency like the Dollar, confidence is key. In fact we have already entered an era of « distrust towards the Dollar », resulting from the Bush administration’s loss of external (and now internal) credibility. A study conducted by the Pew Research Center on the image of the United States worldwide[3] confirmed that “there is no sign that the EU crisis has fuelled a desire for a closer trans-Atlantic partnership”. The study notices on the contrary that « most Europeans surveyed want to take a more independent approach from the U.S. on security and diplomatic affairs ».
This has a corrosive effect on the credibility of the Dollar: in addition to monetary, economic and financial problems, an increasing rejection of the United States is felt among public opinions, in particular those of the country’s historic European ally and the second holder of Treasury Bonds (over 500 billion USD in November 2005, after Japan owning 682 billion, and far ahead of China owning 250 billion)[4].