New contributor! Justin Frewen: Why do certain states become involved in trying to assist ‘Failed States’ identify and implement solutions to their internal conflicts and/or political instability? Why the EU or other bodies are willing to commit themselves to providing state-building assistance  given the considerable resources needed ? The ‘Failed States’ Conundrum ...

The current wave of interest on the part of the international community, or more precisely the more economically developed regions such as the EU, to intervene in states classified as having failed, is not a new one. As Rondinelli and Montgomery observe:

History is replete with attempts by foreign governments either forcibly or through diplomatic pressure to impose governance institutions on other states. For centuries, European powers displaced indigenous governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the quest to build colonial empires. (2005: 15)

The present approach to state-building can arguably be traced back to the post World War II occupations of Japan and Germany and the provision of US aid through the Marshall plan to assist in the reconstruction of Europe. Further historical traces can also be seen in the United States led military interventions in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa to remove ‘hostile’ regimes and rebuild conflict-ravaged countries as ‘democratic market’ economies. However, striking discontinuities also exist with these previous state-building efforts, the majority of which can be attributed to the end of the Cold War and the attendant change in the ‘character of conflicts’.

So, why do certain states become involved in trying to assist ‘Failed States’ identify and implement solutions to their internal conflicts and/or political instability?

Explanations tend to fall broadly into two camps. The first of these might be referred to as that of the liberal internationalists or liberal cosmopolitans who emphasise the moral imperatives of providing assistance to protect the rights of those living under dictatorial or harsh authoritarian regimes. The second would be the realist camp, which contends that ‘Failed States’ are a source of insecurity to the whole global community including, most importantly, the North (northern hemisphere).

Of course, in reality, those advocating for direct intervention or the provision of aid to countries suffering from domestic conflict often draw upon the arguments of both the liberal internationalist and realist camps. The 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrates such a rhetorical approach whereby both security and humanitarian concerns were raised at different stages to justify the US-led invasion.

In either case, however, states that are subject to ‘interventions’ or that become the recipients of assistance programmes

are generally regarded by the international development establishment as displaying characteristics of ‘failed states,’ i.e., their state apparatuses are unable to exercise full control over their respective territories, are unable to fulfill domestic and international development and legal obligations, lack effective national judicial systems to ensure the ‘rule of law,’ do not demonstrate the requisites of liberal democracy, and are unable to prevent their territories from being used in the perpetration of economic and other crimes. (Guttal 2005a: 40)

There is one other category of state that is generally considered as requiring state-building support. These are states that are emerging from a period of domestic conflict.

As the World Bank reported in 2006, some 20 million people worldwide lost their lives through civil wars with another 67 million being displaced. In the fifteen years leading up to 2006, some 16 of the 20 poorest countries in the world had suffered from a major armed conflict. (World Bank 2006: 1)

However, despite an annual increase in the number of new conflicts breaking out since the end of the Cold War, the total number of ongoing armed struggles experienced a decline for the first time since WWII, as the number of resolved conflicts exceeds new conflicts. This positive development meant that the period between 1992 - the high point for internal conflicts in the post-World War II era - and 2003 saw a reduction of 40% in the number of state-based conflicts worldwide.

However, the success of state-building operations has varied considerably, with most failing to live up to expectations. According to Paris and Sisk, the operations of the international agencies in Liberia and Timor Leste “prematurely reduced their efforts to secure peace in the wake of conflict”, in Bosnia and Kosovo, there was an increase in the frustration levels with the international community as “international state-building efforts have lingered on in seeming perpetuity, while reconciliation and institutional reform efforts have stalled” while post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq are experiencing critical and exceptional difficulties in their attempts to construct “effective and legitimate governmental structures”. (Paris & Sisk 2007: 1) Indeed, serious questions have even been raised as to the sustainability of the international community’s institutional reform efforts in what were hitherto generally regarded as the most successful state-building operations in countries such as Cambodia, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Other commentators would argue though that while the record may be far from perfect in terms of the backing the international community has provided to ‘Failed States’, failure to provide such assistance would significantly raise the risk of violence re-erupting with the consequent humanitarian risks for the indigenous population as well as provoking potential security risks for the international community.

Given the immense challenges inherent in assisting ‘Failed States’ the international community is now cooperating to an ever greater extent to deliver the required support. In this respect, the partnership which has developed between the EU and the UN over the past decade or so, has assumed an ever greater importance. Contributing almost two fifths of the UN’s budget, the EU has emphasised its strong commitment to a policy of international multilateralism. Seeing the UN as a critical component of its’ external policy efforts, the EU has tried to use the UN as the ideal forum for the construction of an international structure founded on universal rules and values, that will facilitate a rapid response on the part of the international community to any global challenge, threat or crisis that might emerge. 

This policy of international cooperation can be seen clearly in the high level of coordination between the EU and the UN in the area of state-building, both in the areas of peacekeeping and peace-building. In Chad, the EU, through its member states, provided a bridging operation until the UN was in a position to establish its own regional mission there. The UN for its part has also supported the EU, as in Kosovo when its Interim Administration set the stage for the formation of the European Union Role of Law Mission.

Given the considerable resources needed to assist ‘Failed States’ in their reconstruction, critics have raised the question as to why the EU or other bodies are willing to commit themselves to providing state-building assistance? For some, the motive is at best a selfish one. Through engaging in the rebuilding of the institutions and socio-political framework, the donor states are able to obtain substantial leverage over the future direction of the ‘Failed State’ in question. In many instances, according to these commentators, the failed state is coerced into adopting “a market-based capitalist economic system, twinned with a political regime that is willing to promote and defend free market capitalism.” (Guttal 2005b: 73) Rather than enabling a ‘Failed State’ devise its own socio-economic and political solutions, it is forced to adopt a particular political system and enter the international economy on terms not of its own choosing.

However, irrespective of the underlying motives of bodies such as the EU in providing assistance to ‘Failed States’, it is clear that the rise in the negotiated resolution of conflicts has paved the way, at least for the immediate future, for an even greater involvement in state-building efforts on the part of the international community. 

Justin Frewen*
Galway, Ireland

*Justin Frewen has worked as a Consultant with the UN since 1997 and is currently a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Galway, Ireland. (Read more about)
 

Bibliography:

♦ Guttal, S. (2005a) ‘Reconstruction: A Glimpse into an Emerging Paradigm’, Silent War
♦ The US’ Ideological and Economic Occupation of Iraq, (Focus on the Global South Publication), http://www.focusweb.org/pdf/Iraq_Dossier.pdf
♦ Guttal, S. (2005b) ‘The Politics of Post-war/post-Conflict Reconstruction’, Development, 48(3)
♦ Paris. R. & Sisk, T. D. (2007) Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding, http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/211/iparpps.pdf, accessed 16 March 2008
♦ Rondinelli, D.A. & Montgomery, J.D. (2005) Regime Change and Nation Building: Can Donors Restore Governance in Post-Conflict States? Public Administration Development 25
♦ World Bank (2006) Post-Conflict Fund and Licus Trust Fund Annual Report 2006, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/10133-PCFAnnRpt2006_LowRes.pdf